Time-Inconsistency and Welfare Program Participation: Evidence from the NLSY by Hanming Fang & Dan Silverman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
TIME-INCONSISTENCY AND WELFARE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION:









We are deeply indebted to Ken Wolpin for his advice and encouragement on this project. We also
thank Steve Berry, John Bound, Stefano Della Vigna, Zvi Eckstein, Michael Keane, David Laibson,
Donghoon Lee, Ulrike Malmandier, Robert Miller, Daniele Paserman, Andrew Postlewaite, Matthew
Rabin, Mark Rosenzweig, John Rust, Kent Smetters and participants at many seminars and conferences
for helpful suggestions and discussions. Finally, we thank three anonymous referees for careful comments
that much improved the paper. We are responsible for the remaining errors and shortcomings. The
views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Hanming Fang and Dan Silverman. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Time-Inconsistency and Welfare Program Participation: Evidence from the NLSY
Hanming Fang and Dan Silverman




We empirically implement a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program participation
for never-married mothers with potentially time-inconsistent preferences. Using panel data on the
choices of single women with children from the NLSY 1979, we provide estimates of the degree of
time-inconsistency, and of its influence on the welfare take-up decision. With these estimates, we conduct
counterfactual experiments to quantify the utility loss stemming from the inability to commit to future
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Economists studying choice over time typically assume decision makers are impatient and,
traditionally, this impatience is modelled in a very particular way: agents discount future streams
of utility or pro￿ts exponentially over time. Strotz (1956) showed that exponential discounting is
not just an analytically convenient assumption; without this assumption, intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution will change as time passes, and preferences will be time-inconsistent.
A recent literature has built on the work of Strotz and others to explore the consequences of
relaxing the standard assumption of time-consistent discounting. Drawing both on experimental
research and on common intuition, economists have built models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
to capture the tendency of decision makers to seize short term rewards at the expense of long-term
preferences.1 This literature studies the implications of time-inconsistent preferences, and their
associated problems of self-control, for a variety of economic choices and environments.2
This paper is an empirical investigation of the relationship between time discounting and work
and welfare program participation decisions. Using panel data on the choices of never-married
women with dependent children, we estimate a dynamic structural model of labor supply and
welfare program participation that allows present-biased time preferences. Our estimates, which
also allow for unobserved heterogeneity in skills and tastes, indicate a time-inconsistent discount
function. Implementing the quasi-hyperbolic form, we estimate a present-bias factor considerably
less than one, and reject a standard exponential discounting model.
The paper makes two contributions to the literature on present-biased preferences. First, by
applying a model that allows quasi-hyperbolic preferences to the problem of labor supply and
welfare program participation, we provide an economically signi￿cant setting for an evaluation
of the importance of time-inconsistency. As a source of information about time-preferences, this
context has the advantage that labor supply decisions are among the most consequential economic
choices that individuals make: they drive time use for working-age adults. A disadvantage of
1A body of experiments, reviewed in Ainslie (1992) and in several papers in Loewenstein and Elster (1992), indicate
that hyperbolic time discounting may parsimoniously explain some basic features of the intertemporal decision making
that are not consistent with simple models with exponential discounting. Speci￿cally, standard decision models with
exponential discounting are not easily reconciled with commonly observed preference reversals: subjects choose the
larger and later of two prizes when both are distant in time, but prefer the smaller but earlier one as both prizes draw
nearer to the present (see Rubinstein 2003 and Halevy 2006 for alternative explanations of preference reversals).
2For examples, models of time-inconsistent preferences have been applied by Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a,b) to consumption and savings; by Barro (1999) to growth; by Gruber and Koszegi (2001) to smoking
decisions; by Krusell, Kuru￿ s￿ cu, and Smith (2002) to optimal tax policy; by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) to belief
formation; by Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) to job search.
1focusing on welfare decisions is that it leads us to examine a special segment of the population
(never-married women with children): our results may not extend beyond that group.3 It may be,
however, that time-inconsistency is particularly consequential for this population. Recent welfare
reforms and anecdotal evidence indicate a commonly held view: the trade-o￿ between the short-
term costs of entering the labor force at a low wage relative to the welfare bene￿t, and the long
term reward of higher wages from the accumulation of work experience, may generate problems of
self-control. These self-control problems may, in turn, provide a rationale for the common belief
that the decision to rely on welfare for many years is, somehow, suboptimal. Our previous research
makes clear how and when this common belief might be justi￿ed if preferences are time-inconsistent,
and shows how self-control problems may produce important observable di￿erences in the behavior
of time-consistent and time-inconsistent agents (Fang and Silverman, 2004).
The paper’s second contribution is methodological. Economists have so far largely calibrated
models of time-inconsistent preferences to match important moments of aggregate data sets (for
example, Laibson et al. 1998). In this paper, we estimate the structural parameters of the model,
including the present-bias parameter, from a single panel data set.4 Two recent papers also use ￿eld
data to structurally estimate discount factors. Paserman (2005) estimates a structural job search
model using data on unemployment spells and accepted wages from the NLSY. Laibson, Repetto
and Tobacman (2005) estimate a structural model of consumption and saving. They calibrate some
of their model parameters and estimate the time discount factors using the method of simulated
moments.
More generally, our attempt to quantify consequences of time-inconsistency distinguishes this
paper from many in the literature on quasi-hyperbolic discounting. That literature often uses
stylized models to demonstrate the potentially large behavioral e￿ects of time-inconsistency in
preferences. Quantitative assesments are relatively few.5 Simulating our estimated model allows
us to quantify the e￿ects, in terms of behavior and utility, of obtaining perfect commitment ability
or imperfect commitment via welfare reform. This analysis is important because whether, even
profound, present-bias in preferences implies economically substantial behavioral consequences is
an empirical question. To illustrate this point, consider the extreme case in which agents’ choices
3There is reason to think that lower income groups will reveal higher rates of time discount. See, e.g., Hausman
(1979), Lawrance (1991), and Paserman (2005).
4Prior research has tested the reduced form implications of hyperbolic discounting. For example, Della Vigna
and Paserman (2005) consider the in￿uence of self control problems on job search; and Della Vigna and Malmandier
(2005) ￿nd evidence of time-inconsistent preferences in data on health club contracts and usage.
5Laibson, et al. (1998), Angeletos, et al. (2001), Gruber and Koszegi (2001), Della Vigna and Paserman (2005),
and Paserman (2005) are notable exceptions.
2among discrete options are made very far from the margin;6 then, even if they were highly present-
biased { their choices would be unlikely to change even when they are able to commit to their future
choices. Similarly, even when the ability to commit would dramatically alter agents’ behavior, it
need not imply large utility gains. To illustrate this point, consider another extreme case in which
agents’ choices are made very close to the margin; then their choices are likely to change when
they can commit their future selves’ behavior. But such changes in choices will have little utility
consequence since these consumers were initially close to the margin. Our simulations of perfect
commitment ability suggest that, for many women in our data, this latter case applies. For many,
the ability to commit leads to substantial changes in behavior but relatively small changes in
discounted lifetime utility.
Finally, this paper is related to a literature on labor supply and welfare participation that
structurally implements models of dynamic decision-making. Miller and Sanders (1997) estimates
a dynamic discrete choice model in which women decide monthly whether to work or receive welfare.
In an e￿ort to explain both the low welfare take-up rate among eligible families and the persistence
of welfare choices among the families who do enroll, Miller and Sanders incorporate wage growth
through work experience, and preferences that adapt both to labor supply and to welfare experience.
As in our paper, fertility and marriage are exogenous. Swann (2005) adds marriage to the choice
set, and looks at women’s decisions annually. Keane and Wolpin (2005) endogenize education,
employment, fertility and marriage decisions. These prior papers all assume exponential time
discounting. Our paper contributes to this literature and to the welfare reform debate with, to our
knowledge, the ￿rst empirical examination of the relationship between time-inconsistency and the
welfare take-up decision.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model and describes
both the intrapersonal game played by the decision maker and the numerical method for obtaining
the game’s solution. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy and discusses identi￿cation issues.
Section 4 describes the data and variable de￿nitions. Section 5 presents the estimation results
and associated simulations. Section 6 provides estimates of both the behavioral consequences and
utility value of an ability to commit, and of various policy changes such as time limits and workfare.
Section 7 concludes.
6That is, if an agent chooses alternative A over B; her utility from A is much larger than that from B; and vice
versa.
32 The Model
We consider a discrete time model of work-welfare decisions by a single parent (interchangeably,
an agent). Each agent has a ￿nite decision horizon starting from her age at the birth of her ￿rst
child, a0, and ending at age A.7 At each age a 2 fa0;:::;Ag; the agent must choose from a set
D that includes three mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives: receive welfare, work in the
labor market, or stay at home without work or welfare. The alternatives of welfare, work and home
are respectively referred to as choices 0;1 and 2; thus D = f0;1;2g:8 The agent’s decision in period
a is denoted by da 2 D:
The return from choosing alternative d for an agent at age a represents all of the current-period
bene￿ts and costs associated with the choice and it is denoted by Ra (d;sa;￿da) where sa is a set of
payo￿-relevant state variables at age a to be detailed below and ￿da is a random shock to the value
of alternative d at age a. We parameterize Ra (d;sa;￿da) as follows.
Welfare. At age a; an agent’s payo￿ relevant state sa includes, among other things, her state of
residence j; the number of her children in period a; denoted by na; and her age-(a ￿ 1) choice da￿1:
In the absence of a time limit, the age￿a return to welfare, Ra (0;sa;￿0a); is given by:9
Ra (0;sa;￿0a) = e(na) + Gj (na) ￿ ￿(da￿1) + ￿0a; (1)
where e(na) is the monetary value of her home production skills or leisure as a function of the
number of her children; Gj (na) is the monetary value of the cash and food welfare bene￿ts in state
j as a function of the number of her children; ￿(da￿1) is the net stigma associated with welfare
participation denominated in dollars; and ￿0a is an idiosyncratic, choice-speci￿c shock.
The value of home production skills (leisure) is allowed to depend on the number of children
to capture the additional demands or rewards of having more children. We assume a quadratic
function for e(na) :
e(na) = e0 + e1na + e2n2
a; (2)
7The agent will obtain a continuation value at age A as a function of her payo￿-relevant state variables. The
empirical implementation sets A = 34 which guarantees that, up to age A each woman in the sample continues to
have children younger than 18, and thus meets the minimum requirement for receiving AFDC.
8In reality, it is possible that an agent chooses more than one actions in any period, and there are also distinctions
between part- and full-time work. For example, Edin and Lein (1997) report that, in their study of 379 low-income
single mothers, many welfare recipients both work in the (uno￿cial) labor market and rely on family and neighborhood
resources.
9To decrease the dimension of the state variables in our empirical estimation, we select a sample of women who
have children younger than age 18 throughout the period they are observed and are therefore eligible for welfare,
during all periods that we analyze.
4where e0 may be heterogeneous among never-married mothers. The welfare bene￿ts schedule
Gj (na) is assumed to be an a￿ne function of the number of the agent’s children:10
Gj (na) = ￿j0 + ￿j1na: (3)
The welfare bene￿t schedule Gj (na) is estimated separately for each state of residence j. Finally,





0; if da￿1 = 0
￿; otherwise.
(4)
In words, we assume stigma lasts for only one period after switching into welfare from some other
choice.11 In our empirical estimation, ￿ is also part of the unobserved heterogeneity we allow
for (see below). The speci￿cation of welfare stigma in (4) is most natural if we interpret the
stigma as the psychic and administrative costs associated with welfare take-up. If we take a more
general interpretation of stigma, then (4) imposes a particular form of stigma decay with continued
participation. Further discussion of this assumption is presented in section 3.2, below.
If there are welfare time limits, the cumulative number of periods an agent has received welfare
prior to age a is also payo￿ relevant. This variable is denoted by ￿a. Given a lifetime limit of L





e(na) + Gj (na) ￿ ￿(da￿1) + ￿0a; if ￿a < L
￿1; otherwise.
Work. An agent’s age-a return from work Ra(1;sa;￿1a) is her wage. Following a standard theory
of human capital, we model this wage as the product of a (constant) rental price of human capital,
r, and the quantity of skill units held by the individual ha (sa;￿1a):
Ra(1;sa;￿1a) = rha (sa;￿1a):
10The actual welfare bene￿ts schedule deviates from a linear function approximation by a few dollars at most. We
abstract from asset and income restrictions on welfare eligiblity.
11The net stigma parameter ￿(da￿1) has, since Mo￿tt (1983), become standard in empirical studies of welfare
participation. Its primary function is to help explain the fraction of welfare-eligible adults who remain at home
without work or welfare.
12We assume here that time limits are perfectly and uniformly enforced. In reality, the implementation of time
limits has been complex with many states e￿ectively providing exemptions to large portions of the population that
hits their limits (Bloom et al. 2002). Moreover, there is no national database for preventing recepients who migrate
across states from receiving more than 5 years of bene￿ts. Such interstate migrants will, however, often face other
restrictions on their eligibility.
5When the state is sa; an agent’s age-a skills are given by
ha (sa;￿1a) = exp
￿
h0 + ￿1g0 + ￿2xa + ￿3x2
a + ￿4I(xa > 0) + ￿5I(da￿1 6= 1) + ￿1a
￿
; (5)
where h0 is the agent’s (unobserved) skill endowment at the birth of her ￿rst child; g0 is her
completed years of schooling at the birth of her ￿rst child; xa is her total work experience prior to
age-a; da￿1 is her choice in the previous period; and ￿1a is the age-a skill shock. In speci￿cation (5),
I(￿) is an indicator function equal to one if the expression in parentheses is true. Thus ￿4I(xa > 0)
takes value ￿4 if the agent acquired any work experience before age a and captures a persistent
￿rst-year experience e￿ect. The term ￿5I(da￿1 6= 1) takes value ￿5 (which is presumably negative)
whenever the agent did not work in the previous period. Thus the parameter ￿5 represents the one-
time depreciation of human capital that occurs whenever the agent leaves work to choose welfare
or home. Note that the functional form (5) implies that the sum (lnr + h0); but not lnr and h0
separately, can be identi￿ed.
Home. An agent’s current-period return from staying home without work or welfare Ra (2;sa;￿2a)
is speci￿ed as follows:
Ra (2;sa;￿2a) = e(na) + ￿I(da￿1 = 2) + ￿2a
where e(na) is the same monetary value of home production as in (2); ￿ captures the possible decay
or appreciation of the value of home production when a woman stays home without welfare (it,
too, will be part of the unobserved heterogeneity we allow for); and ￿2a is a choice-speci￿c shock.
We assume that the choice-speci￿c shocks ￿a = (￿0a;￿1a;￿2a) are distributed according to a joint
normal distribution N(0;￿); and they are serially uncorrelated.
Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity, and State Variables. So far we have described
the choices for a typical never-married mother. Now we describe the payo￿-relevant state variables
sa and their transitions in greater detail, as well as the observed and unobserved heterogeneity
among single mothers that we will introduce in our empirical estimation.
We analyze a never-married woman’s work/welfare/home decisions from the age when she was
￿rst surveyed in the NLSY or when she gave birth to her ￿rst child, whichever occurred later.13
When an agent ￿rst enters our analysis at age a0, we observe a set of initial conditions, including
13Among all women in the NLSY, 21% had already given birth to a child before 1979, the ￿rst year of the survey. To
insure that these women maintain minimum eligibility for AFDC until 1991, we exclude all women with children older
than age 3 when ￿rst interviewed in 1979. As a result, among those women who had a child when ￿rst interviewed,
the oldest who remained in our sample was just 20 years old in 1979.
6her state of residence j; her years of completed schooling g0; her prior work experience x0; and
her decision in the period prior to the birth of her ￿rst child da0￿1:14 We assume that an agent’s
state of residence remains unchanged during the course of the data, and she does not complete
any more schooling; thus (j;g0) are constant over time.15 We do not model the process that
generated the di￿erences in initial conditions among agents; instead we assume that the di￿erences
in initial conditions are captured by some persistent, unobserved heterogeneity. Speci￿cally, and as
noted above, we allow for heterogeneity in the labor market and home skill endowments (h0;e0),
the non-welfare home production decay ￿; and welfare stigma ￿. Section 3 describes how our
method allows for a correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and observable initial conditions.
Because we treat state of residence, schooling, and work/welfare decisions prior to age a0 as pre-
determined, the intertemporal tradeo￿s that dictated these decisions do not inform our estimates
of the (homogeneous) discount function.
An agent’s period-a state variables include her prior work experience xa; the number of her
children na; the number of prior periods she had participated in welfare ￿a, and her last period
decision da￿1 2 D: Thus (xa;na;￿a;da￿1) represents the potentially time-varying period-a state
variables. To summarize, an agent’s period-a state variables sa = (j;g0;xa;na;￿a;da￿1); and we
write the space for the state variables at period a as Sa: The evolution of the state variables is
straightforward except for na; the number of children. We treat the arrival of additional children





na + 1, with probability ￿(a;na;da)
na, with probability 1 ￿ ￿(a;na;da);
where ￿(a;na;da) is a logistic function:
￿(a;na;da) =
exp[￿0 + ￿1a + ￿2na + ￿3I(da = 0) + ￿4I(da = 1)]
1 + exp[￿0 + ￿1a + ￿2na + ￿3I(da = 0) + ￿4I(da = 1)]
: (6)
Preferences. We now describe an agent’s intertemporal preferences. We assume that an agent
consumes all of the returns associated with her choice d in each period and obtains an instantaneous
utility ua = Ra (d;sa;￿da): An agent in period a is concerned about both her present and future
instantaneous utilities. Let Ua (ua;ua+1;:::;uA) represent an agent’s intertemporal preferences from
14We rely on the NLSY’s retrospective questions (going back as far as 1975) regarding work/welfare experience to
provide information about the initial conditions of those women in the sample who already had children when ￿rst
interviewed in 1979.
15In fact, 85% of the sample described below continued, throughtout the period observed, to reside in their state
of residence at age a0. In the same sample 34% goes on to acquire additional schooling after the birth of their ￿rst
child. Of this fraction, approximately half acquires less than one additional year of schooling.
7the perspective of period a: We adopt a simple and now commonly used formulation of agents’
potentially time-inconsistent preferences: (￿;￿)-preferences (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997,
and O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a):
De￿nition 1. (￿;￿)-preferences are intertemporal preferences represented by




where ￿ 2 (0;1];￿ 2 (0;1]; and a 2 fa0;a0 + 1;:::;Ag:
Following the terminology of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), the parameter ￿ is called the
standard discount factor and it captures long-run, time-consistent discounting; the parameter ￿
is called the present-bias factor and it captures short-term impatience. The standard exponential
discounting model is nested as a special case of (￿;￿)-preferences when ￿ = 1: When ￿ 2 (0;1);
(￿;￿)-preferences capture \quasi-hyperbolic" time discounting (Laibson, 1997). We say that an
agent’s preferences are time-consistent if ￿ = 1; and are present-biased if ￿ 2 (0;1).
Following previous studies of time-inconsistent preferences, we will analyze the behavior of an
agent by thinking of the single individual as consisting of many autonomous selves, one for each pe-
riod. Each period-a self chooses her current behavior to maximize her current utility Ua (ua;:::;uA);
while her future selves control her subsequent decisions. The literature on time-inconsistent prefer-
ences distinguishes between naive and sophisticated agents (Strotz 1956, Pollak 1968, O’Donoghue
and Rabin 1999a,b). An agent is partially naive if the self in every period a underestimates the
present-bias of her future selves, believing that her future selves’ present bias is ~ ￿ 2 (￿;1); in the
extreme, if the present self believes that her future selves are time-consistent, i.e. ~ ￿ = 1, she is said
to be completely naive. On the other hand, an agent is sophisticated if the self in every period a
correctly knows her future selves’ present-bias ￿ and anticipates their behavior when making her
period-a decision.
2.1 Strategies, Payo￿s and Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to Markov strategies and de￿ne a feasible strategy for a period-a self
as a mapping ￿a : Sa ￿ R3 ! D, where ￿a (sa;￿a) 2 f0;1;2g is simply the choice of the agent’s
period-a self over welfare, work or home when her state variables are sa and the period-a shock
vector is ￿a = (￿0a;￿1a;￿2a): With slight abuse of notation, we write Ra (￿a (sa;￿a);sa;￿a) as the
instantaneous period-a utility the agent obtains from strategy ￿a when the state is sa and shocks
are ￿a:
8A strategy pro￿le for all selves is ￿ ￿ f￿tg
A
t=a0 : It speci￿es for each self her action in all




t=a as the continuation strategy pro￿le from period a to A: To de￿ne and characterize the
equilibrium of the intrapersonal game of an agent with potentially time-inconsistent preferences, we
￿rst introduce a useful concept: write Va (sa;￿a;￿+
a ) as the agent’s period-a expected continuation
utility when the state variable is sa and the shock vector is ￿a under her long-run time preference
for a given a continuation strategy pro￿le ￿+
a : We can think of Va (sa;￿a;￿+
a ) as representing
(hypothetically) her intertemporal preferences from some prior perspective when her own present-
bias is irrelevant. Speci￿cally, Va (sa;￿a;￿+






= RA (￿A (sA;￿A);sA;￿A) + ￿E[W (sA+1)jsA;￿A (sA;￿A)]; (7)
where W (sA+1) is the continuation value at the terminal age A as a function of the period-(A+1)
state variables; and the expectation is taken over the fertility shock conditional on sA; as modelled
















where the expectation is taken over both the conditional fertility shock and ￿a+1:
We will de￿ne the equilibrium for a partially naive agent whose period-a self believes that,
beginning next period, her future selves will behave optimally with a present-bias factor of ~ ￿ 2
[￿;1].17 Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b, 2001), we ￿rst de￿ne the concept of an agent’s
perceived continuation strategy pro￿le by her future selves.
De￿nition 2. The perceived continuation strategy pro￿le for a partially naive agent is a strategy
pro￿le ~ ￿ ￿f~ ￿ag
A
a=a0 such that for all a 2 fa0;:::;Ag, all sa 2 Sa; and all ￿a 2 R3;
~ ￿a (sa;￿a) = argmax
d2D
n










16In the empirical implementation, we approximate the continuation value by the following function of state vari-
ables:
W (sA+1) = !1nA+1 + !2n
2
A+1 + !3xA+1 + !4x
2
A+1 + !5I(dA = 1) + !6I(dA = 2):
Our approach follows, for example, Keane and Wolpin (2001) by approximating terminal valuations with a parsimo-
nious polynomial. The monte carlo evidence in Keane and Wolpin (1994) indicates that such polynomials approximate
of the value function quite well.
17Note, we de￿ne equilibrium for partially naive agents to ease exposition; it has the virtue of incorporating the
naive and sophisticated agents as special cases. We are not, however, estimating the naivety parameter ~ ￿ in our
empirical analysis.
9That is, if an agent is partially naive with perceived present-bias by future selves at ~ ￿; then her
period-a self will anticipate that her future selves will follow strategies ~ ￿+
a+1 ￿ f~ ￿tg
A
t=a+1 : Given
this perception, the period-a self’s best response is called perception-perfect strategy pro￿le.




a=a0 such that, for all a 2 fa0;:::;Ag, all sa 2 Sa; and all ￿a 2 R3;
￿￿
a (sa;￿a) = argmax
d2D
￿










When the agent is sophisticated, the perceived continuation strategy pro￿le is correct. That is,
for a sophisticated agent
~ ￿a (sa;￿a) = argmax
d2D
￿










and thus ~ ￿ = ￿￿: For sophisticates, then, the perception-perfect strategy pro￿le is the familiar
subgame perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal con￿ict game. In our empirical implementation,
we will report results for both completely naive
￿




~ ￿ = ￿
￿
:
2.2 Numerical Solution of ￿￿
In our empirical implementation, the terminal age A is ￿nite. This allows us to numerically
solve the perception-perfect strategy pro￿le ￿￿ recursively. The solutions for sophisticated and
completely naive agents are merely special cases of the partially naive solution, so we describe how
￿￿ can be numerically solved for a partially naive agent.
First consider the terminal period A: For any sA 2 SA; and ￿A 2 R3; the period-A self’s optimal
strategy is simple:
￿￿
A (sA;￿a) = argmax
d2D
fRA (d;sA;￿da) + ￿￿E[W (sA+1)jsA;d]g:
A partially naive agent at period-(A ￿ 1); however, would perceive that her period-A self would
follow
~ ￿A (sA;￿A) = argmax
d2D
n
RA (d;sA;￿da) + ~ ￿￿E[W (sA+1)jsA;d]
o
:
Now for every a = A ￿ 1;:::;a0; every sa 2 Sa; and every ￿a 2 R3; we will have, recursively,
~ ￿a (sa;￿a) = argmax
d2D
n










a (sa;￿a) = argmax
d2D
￿










where Va+1 (￿;￿;￿) is recursively de￿ned by (7) and (8). This completes the recursion.
10Informally, in equilibrium the individual’s decision making proceeds as follows. Beginning
at age a0; the period-a0 self observes her state variable sa0 and then draws three choice-speci￿c
shocks ￿a0 2 N(0;￿). Given the anticipated behavior of her future selves, represented above by
~ ￿+
a0+1, she calculates the realized current rewards and the expected future rewards from each of
her three alternatives, using her own discount factors (￿;￿): This calculation yields ￿￿
a0 (sa0;￿a0);
representing the alternative that o￿ers the highest discounted present value. Then the state variable
is updated for period-(a0 + 1) according to the alternative chosen and the process is repeated. The
perception-perfect strategy at each age a, for each sa 2 Sa; is identi￿ed by the region in the three
dimensional space of ￿a over which each of the alternatives is optimal, for the given state sa. Since
there is no closed-form representation of this solution, we will, in the estimation and simulations
below, solve the game numerically by backward recursion using crude Monte Carlo integration to











The solution to the intrapersonal game described above provides the inputs for estimating the
parameters of the model by the following method. We ￿rst describe the structure of our data (see
also Section 4). We have data on choices, state variables and related outcomes (such as welfare
bene￿t levels and accepted wages) from a sample of agents each of whom solves the intrapersonal
con￿ict game. In what follows, we use superscript i 2 f1;:::;Ng to index the agents. Our data









0 denotes the time individual i becomes part of our analysis, which is the
latter of the age at which she gave birth to her ￿rst child and the date of the ￿rst interview; and Ai















with the understanding that wi
a = ; if di
a 6= 1: We also have a separate data set that provides the
welfare bene￿t levels for families of di￿erent sizes for all the states of residence, denoted by Gj
18The numerical solution method we employ follows closely Keane and Wolpin (1994). However, because the state
space of our model is, conditional on type, relatively small (roughly 150,000 elements at age A = 34), we do not
use Keane and Wolpin’s method for approximating the expected continuation values using only a subset of the state
space. Instead we approximate the expected continuation value for every element of the state space by Monte Carlo
integration. Based on sensitivity analysis we chose to rely on 150 draws from the ￿ distribution to perform this
integration.
19The age at which we last observe the agent in the data A
i is not, in most cases, the terminal age in the model
A: We solve for all decisions up to A; but for each woman with chidren, only her decisions up to age A
i inform the
likelihood.
11where j indexes the state of residence. We denote our data set by D:
The decision at any age a is deterministic for the agent for a given vector (sa;￿a) 2 Sa￿R3, but
it is probabilistic from our perspective since we do not observe the shock vector ￿a: As we described
in the last paragraph of Subsection 2.2, for a given parameters of the model ￿; we can numerically
solve for the perception-perfect strategy pro￿le as the solution to the game, and it then provides
the probability of choosing alterative di
a at state si
a and, if di
























We ease the implementation by estimating two parts of the model outside of our basic choice
framework. First, the parameters ￿j￿(￿0j;￿1j) in the welfare bene￿ts function Gj (￿) [see Eq. (3)]
are taken as the mean of estimated real bene￿t function in the agent’s state of residence j over the
period observed.20 Table A2 of the Appendix presents these estimated parameters, and summary
statistics for the 20 U.S. states represented in the sample. Second, we estimate the parameters
￿ ￿(￿0;￿1;￿2;￿3;￿4) of the fertility function ￿(a;na;da) [See Eq. (6)] separately by estimating a
logit.21
Given this set of estimated parameters, the remaining parameters of the model, including those
in the utility function, the returns functions, and the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks ￿;


















~ ￿;^ ￿j; ^ ￿
￿i
: (9)







~ ￿;^ ￿j; ^ ￿
￿i
is a three-dimensional integral which we approx-
imate using 300 Monte Carlo draws to form kernel-smoothed simulators of the probabilities.23
20We thank Ken Wolpin for providing us with these estimates. The State of residence is de￿ned as the State in
which the respondent resided at the birth of her ￿rst child.
21We treat the estimates of these functions as determined. In fact, ignoring the sampling errors associated with
these estimates will tend to make the calculated standard errors of our structural estimates too small. We assume
that this e￿ect is modest and does not a￿ect our qualitative conclusions.
22To ease identi￿cation and the computational burden we make the relatively standard assumption
that Cov(￿0a;￿1a) = Cov(￿1a;￿2a) = 0: The remaining elements of the variance-covariance matrix
(V ar(￿0a);V ar(￿1a);V ar(￿2a);Cov(￿0a;￿2a)) are estimated.
23We chose 300 draws after tests for sensitivity of the simulated probabilities and data ￿t to changes in the number
123.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity
The likelihood function in (9) applies to a sample that is homogenous except for the following
observable initial conditions at the latter of the birth of the ￿rst child and the date of ￿rst interview:
age ai
0, education gi
0; work experience xi
ai
0
, previous period choice di
ai
0￿1 and the state of residence
ji.24 The skills and preferences of individuals are likely to vary, however, in unobserved ways that
are both persistent, and correlated with observed initial conditions. For example, those with greater
endowments of unobserved human capital may be more likely to prolong schooling and postpone
both childbirth and entry into the workforce. Ignoring this persistent heterogeneity would generate
inconsistent estimates of the model’s parameters.
To allow for the possibility of persistent heterogeneity correlated with initial conditions, we
posit that agents can be of K possible types, indexed by k 2 f1;:::;Kg; and allow di￿erent types
of agents to di￿er, as we brie￿y mentioned in Section 2, in their home production skill endowment
e0; unobservable labor market skill endowment h0; welfare stigma ￿; and non-welfare home pro-





0 and ￿(k) for each k 2 f1;:::;Kg respectively.25
The ex ante probability that an agent i is of type k is denoted by Pi
k: To capture correlation
between an agent’s unobservable type and her initial conditions, we allow Pi
k to depend on all of
her observable initial conditions except state of residence in the form of a multinomial logit.26 That


































is the present value of choosing alternative d at period
a; and ￿ is the smoothing parameter. In the estimation results that follow, ￿ is set to 150, again based on sensitivity
analysis. For a related application of this kernel smooother, see Eckstein and Wolpin (1999).
24In fact the initial levels of work and welfare experience do not much vary in our NLSY79 subsample. Just 14%
had more than a year of work experience before entering our subsample, and just 8% had received welfare before ￿rst
being surveyed in 1979.
25Given that estimation of discount factors has proven problematic in some settings roughly similar to ours (e.g.,
van der Klaauw, 1996, Rust and Phelan, 1997, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999) we did not allow heterogeneity in discount
factors. In our estimation, we choose K = 3 after sensitivity analysis; experimenting with a model with fourth types
substantially increased computation time but did not show promise of sign￿cantly improving within-sample ￿t, or the
likelihood. Computation costs dissuaded us, however, from pursuing the model with four types to the point where
likelihood maximization routine converged.
26We omit State of residence because the variation in welfare bene￿ts in the data provides an important source of
identi￿cation for the model’s parameters. Allowing type to depend on State of residence would weaken our ability
to identify, in particular, unobserved home production and welfare stigma parameters from variation in decisions
correlated with variation in initial conditions, welfare bene￿ts and wages.

































































































































: Now write ~ ￿k as the set of model parameters for type-k agent to be

























~ ￿k;^ ￿j; ^ ￿
￿i
: (10)
3.2 Identi￿cation of ￿ and ￿
We now consider the issue of identi￿cation of the discount parameters ￿ and ￿: In some mod-
els, the decisions of sophisticated present-biased agents are observationally equivalent to those of
time-consistent exponential discounters, and identi￿cation of these two parameters is thus a pri-
ori precluded. For example, Barro (1999) demonstrates the observational equivalence in a growth
model with sophisticated agents, perfect credit markets, and log utility. This equivalence does not
hold more generally. Harris and Laibson (2001) show, for example, that observational equivalence
is not obtained when the assumption of perfect credit markets is relaxed. This illustrates that, as is
true in any structural empirical paper, the ability to separately identify ￿ and ￿ results from both
the structure imposed by the model and the variation in the data. In what follows, we approach
the identi￿cation questions from three di￿erent angles.
Formal Arguments for Distinguishing Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounting in a
Simpler Model. In a related paper (Fang and Silverman, 2006), we studied the identi￿cation
issue of expotential and hyperbolic discounting in a somewhat simpler model of welfare program
participation for single mothers that contains most of the central elements of the one we estimate
here. In that paper we show that, if there are three or more periods of observations; then a present
bias model with ￿ 2 (0;1);￿ 2 (0;1) can be distinguished from exponential discounting model
14with ￿ = 1 and ￿ 2 (0;1) using standard data, and without making parametric assumptions on the
distribution of the stochastic shocks to payo￿s (see Proposition 2 of Fang and Silverman, 2006).27
In other words, if standard data were generated by a model of (￿;￿) discounting, there exist
no parameters of the model with time-consistent discounting (￿ = 1) that could rationalize those
data. The identi￿cation argument we presented there uses ideas ￿rst presented in Hotz and Miller
(1993): the standard data contain information about individuals’ choices in each period, and thus
provide information about conditional choice probabilities. The conditional choice probabilites,
together with the accepted wage and welfare bene￿t information in the data, allow us to calculate
the continuation values for each choice ￿ a la Hotz and Miller. These continuation values then put
restrictions on the choice probabilities in the previous period. With three or more periods of data,
an exponential discounting model could not rationalize the choice probabilities if the data were
generated by a model of (￿;￿) discounting.
The argument for identi￿cation presented in Fang and Silverman (2006) would, with suitable
adaptation, apply to our current setting, if we did not introduce unobserved heterogeneity.28 As is
well known, unobserved heterogeneity of agents would prevent \direct observation" of conditional
choice probabilities, a key step of Hotz and Miller (1993)-style identi￿cation argument. What is
clear from Fang and Silverman (2006), however, is that (￿;￿)-discounting does not, per se, create
problems for a formal identi￿cation proof in this context.
Formal identi￿cation in a model with unobserved heterogeneity is hard to establish; but we note
two factors which aid us in the current context. First, we have assumed a parametric functional
form (normality) on the joint distribution of the shocks to payo￿s; second, we have, for the typical
member of our sample, many more than three periods of data.
Intuitive Arguments for Identi￿cation: Less formally, there are three important patterns in
the data that together re￿ect, in the context of our model, time-inconsistency in behavior. The
￿rst pattern is the very low levels of work when young: by as late as age 20, just 11% of the
sample is working. The second important pattern is the relatively high levels of work when older:
among 32-year olds in our data, 42% are working.29 Finally, the data reveal substantial returns to
27Standard data sets are formally de￿ned there as data sets that contain information about individuals’ choices
each period, all relevant state variables, welfare bene￿t levels, and accepted wages.
28Fang and Silverman (2006) also abstracted from observed heterogeneity for expositional simplicity, but it is clear
that the identi￿cation proof goes through unchanged as long as we condition on the observed heterogeneity.
29These di￿erences in work levels by age are not merely due to the di￿erent patterns of work and welfare among
those women who ￿rst gave birth, and thus entered the sample, at older ages. For example, among the women in our
sample who had children and were not working at age 20, 36% were working at age 32.
15experience in the labor market.30
Given the returns to experience and the modest AFDC bene￿ts in most states, the low levels
of work when young imply considerable impatience, though not necessarily the present-bias that
would generate time-inconsistency. The eventual transition by many women into work, however,
demands substantial future orientation { workers have to anticipate the relatively steep growth in
wages as they accumulate experience. Given that real wages do not fall with experience31, in a
deterministic setting this combination of behaviors would clearly be time-inconsistent: if an agent
had planned to work eventually, she should have started working immediately. Such delay is a
hallmark of naive, present-biased agents whose false belief that they will embark on a career next
year leads them to postpone entry until a time when the immediate costs are low enough. As Fang
and Silverman (2004) shows, however, even sophisticated present-biased agents may delay entry
into work. This can happen when, for example, the relative return to work is increasing with work
experience, but at a decreasing rate.32 In this circumstance, the sophisticated agent may optimally
choose to delay entry into work until a time when the steepest part of the experience-return-to-work
pro￿le looms large.
In a setting with uncertainty, these transitions might also re￿ect random shocks to the returns to
various choices; but the age-pattern is clear { the transitions tend to go from home and welfare into
work.33 Thus, simple uncertainty that would generate random transitions would not generate this
particular age-trend toward work.34 A similar logic applies to transitions from home into welfare.
If a \career" in welfare will be superior to staying home, that career should begin immediately. To
30Our estimates of the returns to experience are determined, in part, by the selection mechanism implied by our
model. However, Loeb and Corcoran (2001), using very di￿erent methods, estimate remarkably similar returns to
experience for a similar sample of women.
31Likewise, the continuation payo￿ from additional experience should be non-negative. Our point estimates of the
continuation value of experience are, indeed, positive in the unrestricted models.
32This circumstance is captured by \free ride" outcome in Fang and Silveman (2004). The diminishing marginal
return obtains in the model estimated in the present paper because of diminishing marginal wage returns to experience,
increasing bene￿ts of welfare and home prodction as more children arrive, and the decay of welfare stigma.
33A model with habituation or, more generally, state-dependent preferences, might also explain this pattern. We
view present-biased time discounting as one source of what would appear as state-dependent utlity. Also note that our
model accomodates several other forms of \structural" state-dependence as, for example, wages and welfare stigma
are allowed to depend on the recent behavior of the agent.
34Note, however, that the increasing wage returns from experience imply that, once the agent has been working
for a substantial period, the combination of shocks that would induce a switch to welfare or home are rarer. But this
does not fully explain the age-trend toward work since this same mechansim creates \structural" state-dependence
in welfare and home choices as well; the value of switching into work from one of these choices delines the longer it
has been postponed.
16the extent that women postpone entry into long-term welfare spells as a way of avoiding stigma,
this too re￿ects, in the context of our model, time-inconsistency. The size of the delays, and
the eventual long-run rates of work and welfare program participation jointly function to identify
short-term and long-term impatience in the model.
An important element of this intuitive argument is that, in this setting, neither work nor welfare
is an unavoidable task. Time consistent agents would postpone unpleasant tasks, if those tasks were
unavoidable. They would not postpone tasks that are, on net, valuable to them. Time consistent
agents would therefore either wait forever to work or take welfare, or do it immediately. They
would not postpone these decisions.
The above simple argument that identi￿cation comes from delayed entry into work is compli-
cated in the plausible case that the relative value of work increases with the number of children in a
household or with the age of those children. We have accomodated the ￿rst possibility by allowing
the value of home production to be a (quadratic) function of the number of chidren at home. To
keep the state space a managable size, however, we did not let the age of the children directly
a￿ect payo￿s. However, even among the oldest women in our sample most continued to have quite
young children at home; at age 32, half of the sample had a child younger than 6, and the average
age of the youngest child was 6.33 years. More important, the women with younger children were
only slightly less likely to work than those with older children; at age 32, 40% of those with a child
younger than 6 were working, this number is 43% among those whose children are all older than
6. It thus seems unilikely that the positive relationship between age and work that we observe is
driven largely by the increasing ability of women to leave their children unsupervised or in the care
of others.
To the extent that identi￿cation of the discount parameters depends on the relative payo￿ to
welfare, it depends on how welfare stigma and its decay are modeled. Stigma is an important
component of our model in that it helps explain the large fractions who remain at home without
work or welfare. We have assumed that stigma lasts for only one period after switching into welfare
from some other choice. Estimates of a more ￿exible form of stigma decay would be of considerable
intrinsic interest, but are beyond the scope of this paper. Here our goal is simply to approximate
stigma and its decay in a reasonable way, and estimate the parameters of the model under the
assumption that stigma takes this form.
Practical Identi￿cation. Finally, in practice, whether the two discount parameters are sepa-
rately identi￿ed with reasonable precision depends on the curvature of the likelihood surface as we
vary ￿ and ￿: In Figure 1 we present two slices of the log-likelihood surface as a function of ￿ only,
for ￿ = 1 and ￿ = ^ ￿ = 0:338 when other parameters are set at their respective estimates. In order
17to clearly show the curvature, we use two di￿erent scales for the curves. This ￿gure shows that,
along these dimensions, the liklihood exhibits considerable curvature and that when ￿ is set to 1
the maximum log likelihood is substantially lower than its maximum when ￿ = ^ ￿:
[Figure 1 About Here]
4 Data
4.1 Sample De￿nition
The data are taken from the 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY).
The NLSY began in 1979 with 6,283 women ages 14-22, and has interviewed this cohort annually
up to 1994, and biannually since 1994. We restrict attention to the 675 women who, as of their
interview in 1992, had both remained unmarried and had at least one child during the years they
were surveyed. We then consider only the decisions each individual made after the birth of her ￿rst
child and during the calendar years 1978-1991.
Our purpose in selecting this subsample of individuals and years is threefold. First, to be
consistent with our model, we want to restrict attention to those who, if they do not work, are
almost certainly eligible for welfare by virtue of having a child and being unmarried. Second, to
justify better our assumption that anticipated changes in marital status are not driving work and
welfare decisions, we restrict attention to women who never marry during the period observed.35
Third, we want to limit our analysis to decisions made before the changes in welfare eligibility
rules beginning in 1993, and perhaps anticipated by 1992. Finally, again to ease the computational
burden, we further limit our sample to residents of the 20 U.S. states best represented in the data.
This ￿nal restriction leaves us with 483 individuals taken from the NLSY’s core random sample
and its oversamples of blacks and Hispanics.36 These sample selection criteria naturally suggest
caution in generalizing the estimates in this paper to the overall population.37 The women in our
35In fact, by 1993, 2.9% of the sample is observed to be married. This number rises to 10.1% by 1996 and 16.4% by
2002. The potentially interesting e￿ects of anticipated changes in marital status are beyond the scope of this paper.
36The restriction to never-married women with children is especially important and leaves us with a subsample
that is disproportionately drawn from the survey’s oversamples of blacks and hispanics (just 32% of our sample is
drawn from the core of the NLSY). Our sample is therefore disproportionately non-white (80%). For purposes of
comparison, during the period we study, approximately 50% of the parents in AFDC families were never married and
62% were non-white (DHHS, 1996).
37Selection on time preferences may be a particular concern. Women enter the sample only if they have children.
Thus our data consist disproportionately of those who had their children at earlier ages. To the extent that this group
is more present-biased than average, our estimates will be less applicable to other groups. We thank an anonymous
18subsample were observed with at least one child for an average of 9.3 of the 14 years from 1978-1991,
providing us with 4,487 state-choice observations for the estimation.
4.2 Period and Variable De￿nition
At each interview, the NLSY collects welfare participation data as a monthly event history
recorded back to the preceding interview. The survey’s employment data are collected as a weekly
event history. We assume the decision period of the model corresponds to a calendar year, and
identify an agent as age a in a year if she was a years old for at least half that year. The decisions
at each age a are de￿ned as follows: An individual chose welfare at age a if she received Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) for at least six months of the year during which she
was a years old. An individual chose work at age a if she was employed for at least 1,500 hours of
the year during which she was a years old. An agent chose to stay home if she chose neither of the
above.38;39
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the subsample are presented, by age, in Table A1 of Appendix A. Since
none of the women in the subsample marries during the period she is observed, the group we study
is not typical of the general US population. To better understand the ways in which members of the
subsample di￿er from the average population, Table A1 also compares their statistics with those of
the entire sample of women in the NLSY from 1978-1991. Broadly, this comparison suggests that
while the subsample represents the targets of the U.S. welfare policy, it is atypical of the population
as a whole.
[Table 1 About Here]
The distribution of choices among welfare, work, and home is presented by age in Table 1.
We concentrate on the decisions made at ages 16-32, that represent 98 percent of the data. The
referee for pointing this out.
38While some who are coded as on AFDC or as staying home also report working for pay, their work hours are
limited. The average annual hours worked among those classi￿ed as choosing AFDC or home were 179 and 167,
respectively. On 19 occasions a respondent reported that she both received AFDC for at least 6 months of the
previous calendar year and worked more than 1,500 hours that year. In these cases the agent was de￿ned as having
chosen welfare.
39In about 9% of our observations, the respondent was attending school. This part of the sample is concentrated
among agents younger than 18. These observations are also concentrated in the sample we classify as \choosing
home," among whom 15:7% was attending school.
19fraction of the subsample choosing welfare increases considerably between ages 16 and 22. Of the
16 year-olds with at least one child, 32 percent chose welfare while 54 percent of 22 year-olds with
children chose welfare. The proportion choosing work exhibits a comparable increase over the same
period: rising from zero percent of 16 year-olds with children to 17 percent of 22 year-olds. Given
these changes in welfare and work participation we, by de￿nition, observe a more dramatic decline
in the fraction of women with children choosing to remain at home; with 68 percent choosing to
stay home at age 16 and just 29 percent choosing to stay at home at age 22.
While these basic trends continue for the fractions choosing work and home beyond age 22, the
fraction choosing welfare stops increasing and instead exhibits a slow decline after age 22. By age
25, 47 percent of the sample is now choosing welfare, despite having on average more children. By
age 29, the fraction is 43 percent.
Not all of the movements in these age-decision pro￿les re￿ect the changing choices of the same
individuals. The observed transitions are partly due to the fact that the composition of the sample
is changing as the women of the NLSY age and, by virtue of having a child, join the subsample. To
investigate the degree to which the choices of same individuals change over time, Table 2 presents
the one-period transition rates between decisions by the same agent. Here we see evidence of
considerable persistence in individuals’ choices. The rows of Table 2 represent the choices made in
period t ￿ 1; the columns describe the choices made in period t. The top ￿gure (Row %) in each
cell represents the fraction of the subsample that made the row choice in period t ￿ 1 who went
on to make the column choice in period t: The bottom ￿gure (Column %) in each cell shows the
fraction of the subsample that made the column choice in period t who made the row choice in the
previous period. We ￿nd that 84.3% of those who chose welfare in period t ￿ 1 went on to choose
it again in period t: Conversely, of those who chose welfare in period t; 76.7% had chosen welfare
in the previous period. Of those who chose work in period t ￿ 1; 79.3% went on to choose it again
in period t: Decisions to remain at home are considerably less persistent. Of those who chose to
stay home in period t ￿ 1; 59.7% chose it again in period t:
[Table 2 About Here]
5 Results
5.1 Estimates of Welfare Bene￿t Function Gj and Fertility Function ￿
Table A2 in Appendix A presents the parameters of the bene￿t rule for the twenty selected U.S.
states used in our estimation. The bene￿ts include the cash value of AFDC plus food stamps. As
has been often noted, there is considerable variation in bene￿ts levels across U.S. states. In our
20sample, the estimated average annual bene￿t for a mother with two children ranges from $4,856
(1987 dollars) to $9,490. Patterns of welfare participation vary with the level of bene￿ts in ways
consistent with optimizing behavior. In our sample, 56 percent of the residents in the 5 states
with the highest bene￿ts received welfare, while 37 percent of these in the 5 states with the lowest
bene￿ts were on welfare.40
Table A3 in Appendix A presents the parameter estimates of the fertility function (6). These
estimates suggest that the probability of an additional birth is decreasing with age and with the
number of children. The estimates also indicate that, relative to those who stay home, the proba-
bility of an additional birth is lower for workers and higher for those on welfare. We note, however,
that our simple exogenous model of subsequent fertility beyond the ￿rst child explains very little
of the variation in the timing of births in this subsample. The pseudo-R2 is less than 0.02.
5.2 Parameter Estimates
In our estimation, we assume that agents are of three possible types, i.e., K = 3: Tables 3
and 4 present the parameter estimates under three di￿erent restrictions of the model. Column (1)
presents estimates when we restrict agents to be time-consistent, that is, restricting ￿ = 1; Column
(2) presents estimates when agents are assumed to be sophisticated (i.e. ~ ￿ = ￿) and allowed to be
present-biased; and Column (3) presents the estimates when agents are assumed to be completely
naive
￿
~ ￿ = 1
￿
and allowed to be present-biased.41 We present both the point estimates and their
asymptotic standard errors.42
[Tables 3-4 About Here]
In the sophisticated present-bias model, the estimated present-bias factor ￿ equals 0:338 with
a reasonably small standard error of 0:069: A Wald test rejects the hypotheses of time-consistency
(t-statistic 9:53 against the null of ￿ = 1): Our estimate of the standard discount factor ￿ equals
40We do not accomodate the changes in welfare bene￿ts with calendar year. The time pattern of AFDC bene￿ts
di￿ered from that for food stamps. In￿ation outstripped substantial increases in nominal AFDC bene￿ts and lead
to an 11% decline in real average bene￿ts during the period 1980 to 1984. Average real bene￿ts then increased by a
total of 3.6% over then next three years before declining again at an average annual rate of about 1.5% for the next
four years (Crouse 1995). The declines in AFDC bene￿ts were somewhat o￿set, especially at the end of the sample
period, by increases in foodstamp bene￿ts. Our method approximates these non-monotonic real bene￿ts pro￿les with
a State-speci￿c ￿at line.
41Except when ￿ is restricted to equal 1; we make no restrictions on the values the discount parameters make take.
In particular, ￿ and ￿ are each allowed to be greater than one or negative.
42Asymptotic standard errors are estimated using the BHHH, or outer product of gradients, method. See Berndt,
et al. (1974).
210:88 with a standard error of 0:016: Allowing for present-bias improves the data ￿t in a statistically
signi￿cant way { a likelihood ratio test easily rejects the time-consistent model (the ￿2 statistic
for the likelihood ratio test is more than 32). However, the likelihood ratio test does not yield
overwhelming evidence in favor of the completely naive or sophisticated model.43 In what follows,
we will focus on the results from the sophisticated present-biased agent model.44
Besides the discount factors, Tables 3 and 4 also present estimates, by (unobservable) type,
of the net welfare stigma, home production functions, wage functions, continuation value func-
tions, and variance-covariance matrix of the shocks, etc. Of particular interest is the substantial
estimated return to experience in the wage o￿er function, and the considerable variation in the
estimated skills and tastes across types. There is an important average gain in wages for every
year of additional work experience. The unobservable skill levels that determine those wages vary
importantly, however, by type.
Discussion of the Discount Factor Estimates. Our estimates of present bias factor ￿ at
0:338; combined with the estimated standard discount factor ￿ = 0:88, implies a one-year ahead
discount rate of 238%. Our estimate of the present-bias factor is low relative to most of those
estimated in experimental studies, though more similar to Paserman’s (2005) structural estimate
for low wage workers. Inferential studies such as Hausman (1979), and Warner and Pleeter (2001)
estimate discount rates ranging from 0 to 89% depending on the characteristics of the individual
and intertemporal trade-o￿s at stake. Paserman ￿nds, for low-wage workers a discount rate of about
149%. For their benchmark model and calibration, Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman’s (2005) point
estimates of ￿ and ￿ are respectively 0.7031 (with standard error of 0.1093) and 0.9580 (with
standard error of 0.0068), which imply a one-year ahead discount rate of 48:5%:
There are two possible explanations for the di￿erence between our ￿nding and others. First, the
samples cover di￿erent subpopulations. Our sample selection criteria, which restrict our analysis
to mostly poor, never-married women who had children at relatively young age, had relatively low
schooling and did not move across states of residence as much as the population (see Table A1),
may have led to a subpopulation who is most susceptible to present-biases.45 Having said this,
43Technically we can not use a likelihood ratio test to distinguish completely naive and sophisticated present biased
models because they are not nested: Note, however, that both the Akaike Information Criterion and the Bayesian
(Schwartz) Information Criterion, which account for di￿erences in the number of parameters in non-nested models,
reduce to selecting the model with the highest likelihood in cases like this where each model has the same number of
estimated parameters. We are grateful to two referees for pointing this out.
44The key simulation results for naive present-biased are, for completeness, included in Appendix B.
45Hausman (1979), Lawrance (1991), and Paserman (2005) all ￿nd that discount rates are higher for low income
groups.
22however, we would like to emphasize that for the purpose of welfare policymaking, our subsample
may be the relevant subpopulation to study. The second potential explanation for the di￿erence
between our ￿ndings and others is simply that di￿erent papers focus on di￿erent spheres of decision
making, and it is possible that the magnitudes of present bias di￿er by realm of decision.
5.3 Within-sample ￿t
Age-Choice Pro￿les. Summarizing the interaction of the potentially complex and countervailing
e￿ects of time preferences and basic incentives, Figures 2-4 compare the estimated model’s predicted
distributions over the three alternatives (welfare, work and home) to the actual distributions in
the data, by age. The model’s predictions represent the simulated decisions of 1,000 agents in
each of 16 cells de￿ned to re￿ect the sample variation in initial conditions j;a0;g0;xa0; and da0￿1:
There are four di￿erent j categories de￿ned as high, medium-high, medium-low, and low bene￿ts
municipality. Similarly there are four g0 categories de￿ned as 10 years of schooling or less, 11 years
of schooling, 12 years of schooling, and some college at the birth of the ￿rst child. Within each
of these 16 cells, the initial conditions are given by the sample average (bene￿ts, age, schooling,
experience) level in the cell. These sample averages imply probabilities of the agent being of the
three di￿erent unobservable types. The distribution of the 1,000 simulated decisions in each of
these cells is then weighted by the probability of each type and the proportion of the data falling
into that initial condition cell to generate the predicted distributions appearing in Figures 2-4.
[Figures 2-4 About Here]
The simulated age pro￿les match the data reasonably well. Each of the pro￿les implied by the
estimated model assumes approximately the correct shape, and often matches the levels of the data
quite closely. More formally, Table A4 of the appendix presents the within-sample ￿2 goodness of
￿t statistics for the model with respect to the choice distribution, by age.46 Note that among the
15 age groups we examine, the within-sample ￿2 goodness of ￿t rejects the null hypothesis of no
di￿erence between actual and predicted probabilities in 6 instances (among a total of 30 statistics,
two for each age group). While the ￿t is not perfect, we would like to emphasize that our estimation
did not directly use these moment restrictions. These statistics con￿rm the impression given by
Figures 2-4.
Our parameter estimates indicate a high degree of short-term impatience; the one-year-ahead
discount factor is just 0.29. A natural question is whether the behavior associated with such
limited patience is substantially di￿erent from that of completely myopic agents in the model; i.e.,
46This goodness of ￿t test does not correct for sampling error.
23does this limited degree of future orientation meaningfully in￿uence behavior? To answer this
question, we also simulate behavior for the case where, holding all other parameters constant at
their estimated values, agents are assumed to be completely myopic (￿ = ￿ = 0): To be clear, these
are not simulations from the estimates of a completely myopic model (with ￿ and ￿ restricted to
zeros); rather, they re￿ect how behavior would look in the previously estimated environment if
agents were completely myopic. The age-choice pro￿les for these simulations are also displayed
in Figures 2-4. The behavior of myopic agents is qualitatively di￿erent. Most important, myopic
agents eventually enter the labor force at a rate (31% by age 32) substantially lower than is predicted
for even modestly forward-looking agents (46% by age 32).
Transition Probabilities. Table 5 presents the simulated one-period transition probabilities for
the sophisticated present-biased agent model. This table is to be compared with the transition
probability matrix in the data (see Table 2). The model matches the persistence and relative rates
of transition quite well. To illustrate, the estimated model predicts that 84:4% of those who chose
welfare in period t ￿ 1 will go on to choose it again the following period while 11:4% will choose
to stay at home. These ￿gures should be compared with 84:3% and 12:3% observed in the data.
Similarly the model predicts that 57:0% of those choosing home in period t￿1 will remain at home
next period, while 25:9% will switch to welfare, comparable to 59:7% and 28:3% respectively in the
data.
[Table 5 About Here]
Wage Pro￿les. Figures 5 and 6 compare, respectively, the model’s mean wage-age and wage-
experience pro￿les, with the parallel moments in the data. Save the outlying wages of age-18
workers, the model somewhat underestimates of average wages for those who choose to work (see
Figure 5). Overall, however, the average accepted wages, by age, of the model and data are quite
similar. Save the accepted wages of those with no experience, the model slightly underestimates
wage levels while replicating the observed shape of the wage-experience pro￿le (see Figure 6).
[Figures 5-6 About Here]
5.4 Out-of-Sample Fit
As we mentioned in Subsection 4.1, we have used only residents of the 20 U.S. states best
represented in the NLSY in our empirical estimation. The sample of never-married women with
children from the remaining states allows us to examine the estimated model’s out-of-sample ￿t.
The \hold-out" sample is much smaller than the estimation sample; it includes 101 individuals
24and provides just 583 decisions over the relevant years.47 While sampling variation will make close
quantitative ￿t unlikely, we view the comparison as informative. Figure 7 compares the proportions
of this choosing welfare, work and home by age predicted by our present-biased sophisticated model
using the parameter estimates in Section 5.2 with their empirical counterparts from the hold-out
sample.48 The model captures the relative shape of changes in the participation rates as the women
get older, for example, the model’s prediction of the increase in the proportion of working single
mothers mirrors that in the data, but it consistently overestimates the proportion of single mothers
on welfare and underestimates the proportion at home.49
[Figure 7 About Here]
To the extent that the model mispredicts behavior out of sample, it suggests caution in in-
terpreting the counterfactual experiments simulated below. For this reason, and others, we are
reluctant to put a great deal of stock in the precise quantitative predictions of the policy responses.
However, we view the qualitative predictions of the estimated model as informative and useful.
They give a qualitative sense of the importance of time-inconsistency and of the e￿ects of imperfect
commitment devices on behavior and utility in this setting, and in the context of a model whose
parameters have been importantly disciplined by data.
6 Numerical Simulations
The estimates and simulations presented in Subsection 5.2 indicate that the work-welfare-home
decisions of never-married women with children reveal time-inconsistency. With a reasonable degree
of precision, the estimated model indicates a present-bias factor (￿) substantially less than unity.
In this section, we present simulation results for sophisticated present-biased agents. Analogous
results for completely naive present-biased agents are included in Appendix B.
On its own, an estimated ￿ less than one does not imply that time-inconsistency importantly
in￿uences the work-welfare decisions of never-married women with children. It may be that the abil-
ity to commit to future decisions in￿uences behavior in statistically identi￿able, but economically
insubstantial, ways. This possibility is particularly relevant for the model estimated here. In our
model, initial conditions such as welfare bene￿ts in state of residence, and years of schooling, and
47The corresponding numbers in the estimation sample are 483 and 4487.
48We do not compare the model’s predictions with data from women younger than 20 or older than 29 because, in
the left-out sample, the data are especially thin, fewer than 20 observations per age, in these ranges.
49We choose not to present the formal out-of-sample goodness of ￿t test because it will not be very informative
due to the small sample size in the hold-out sample.
25unobservable skills di￿er across individuals; and these di￿erences would be expected to importantly
in￿uence decision making. While time-inconsistency in preferences may a￿ect marginal decisions,
it may be that the in￿uence of initial conditions typically places individuals far from these margins,
and the ability to commit would have little e￿ect on decisions. By extension, if most individuals
are little in￿uenced by their inability to commit to future decisions, the behavioral and utility
consequences of policies such as time limits or workfare that may serve as commitment devices
will not much depend on the time-inconsistency of their targets.50 In the next sections we use the
estimated parameters of the sophisticated present-biased model to quantify both the behavioral
and utility consequences of the ability to commit, and consider how di￿erent policy reforms a￿ect
both behavior and utility in the presence of time-inconsistency.
6.1 Consequences of an Ability to Commit
To evaluate the consequences of an ability to commit to future decisions, we use the estimated
parameters of the sophisticated present-biased model to simulate the decisions of agents with various
initial conditions both with and without commitment ability. In this experiment, an individual has
commitment ability if, starting from the period in which her ￿rst child is born, her future selves
behave as though they were time-consistent (i.e. ￿ = 1), and also believed all of their future
selves to be time-consistent. Equilibrium behavior represents the optimal plan of an individual
considering the sequence of decisions to begin at the birth of her ￿rst child.
Evaluating utility e￿ects in a setting with time-inconsistency is often thought to be especially
problematic because sequences of utility ￿ows may be valued di￿erently by the di￿erent selves of the
same individual. In the literature on time-inconsistency, two criteria have been proposed to serve as
a basis for comparing an agent’s well being: the Pareto criterion (Laibson 1997) and the long-run
utility criterion (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a). The Pareto criterion asks if all the selves are made
better o￿; while the long-run utility criterion takes the perspective of an e￿ectively time-consistent
agent just prior to the decision-making sequence, and asks if she is made better o￿. From the
perspective of policy evaluation, it is not obvious which of these criteria is the more appropriate.
Based on its similarity to prior utility evaluations in structural estimation (see, e.g., Keane and
Wolpin 1997), we adopt the latter criterion for estimating changes in well-being. Speci￿cally, we
calculate the discounted stream of expected lifetime utility for period-a0 self, i.e., the self when her
￿rst child was born if, counterfactually, ￿ = 1: We ￿rst numerically solve for the perception-perfect
strategy pro￿le, denoted by ￿c￿ ￿ f￿c￿
a g
A
a0 for an agent with ￿ = 1 and ￿ = ^ ￿ = 0:875, the point
estimate presented in Table 3. Of course, ￿c￿ depends on agents’ initial conditions at period a0:
50See Fang and Silverman (2004) for a discussion of how time-limits could serve as commitment mechanisms.





As a benchmark for comparison, when agents do not have ability to commit, we also numerically
solve for the perception-perfect strategy pro￿le, denoted by ￿n￿ ￿ f￿n￿
a g
A
a0 for an agent with
￿ = ^ ￿ = 0:338 and ￿ = ^ ￿ = 0:875. Conditional on an agent’s initial conditions, the utility without






Note that Un is not how period-a0 self would have evaluated the lifetime utility with her (￿;￿)
preference, but rather how a prior period self would have evaluated the sequence. We report below
(Uc ￿ Un)=Un as the percentage change in lifetime utility as a result of the ability to commit.
Representative results of the simulations are presented, by initial conditions cell, in Table 6. The
cells (1-8) vary according to the level of the bene￿ts in the state of residence, age and years of
schooling at ￿rst birth, and thus probability of being types 1 and 2. The levels of these initial
conditions are presented in second panel in Table 6. The same initial conditions (by cell) are used
in subsequent tables.
[Table 6 About Here]
Panel 1 of Table 6 indicates that while the behavioral e￿ects of an inability to commit may
be large, they di￿er both in size and sign depending on initial conditions. For example, among
individuals in cell 2, who were relatively young and little educated at the birth of their ￿rst child,
and who live in a high bene￿ts state, work is relatively unattractive and commitment ability leads
them to work somewhat less (2.7%) of the time between ages 18 and 34. For this group, the inability
to commit generated costly delay, not in work, but in the takeup of welfare. With commitment
ability, they are quicker to endure welfare stigma in exchange for the future bene￿t of welfare
receipt. Compare this e￿ect of commitment to that of similarly young and but better educated
individuals in a low bene￿ts state (cell 3). In this second group, for whom working is relatively
attractive, the ability to commit leads them to work an additional 23.3% of the time, representing
a 66 percent increase in their probability of working. Comparing across other cells, we observe
similar disparities in the behavioral reaction depending on the relative attractiveness of welfare
and work. Among the more educated, and those living in lower welfare bene￿ts states, the ability
to commit leads to signi￿cantly more work; among those with less education and living in high
bene￿ts states commitment generates either little, or negative changes in work behavior.
27Importantly, the results of Table 6 also indicate that while the behavioral changes produced
by an ability to commit may be large, the utility e￿ects are invariably modest. The change in
lifetime utility as a result of commitment ranges from $1,737 (a 5:03 percent increase) for those in
cell 7 with the highest levels of education and medium welfare bene￿ts, to $1,525 (a 5.33 percent
increase) for those in cell 5 with medium levels of education and low welfare bene￿ts, and to $1,092
(a 2.37 percent increase) for among those in cell 1 with very low levels of education and welfare
bene￿ts.
It may seem puzzling that the behavioral e￿ects of commitment could be large while the utility
gains among the same group are relatively small. This result derives from two mechanisms. First,
for those delaying welfare takeup in favor of home, the delay in the absence of commitment is fairly
short { typically less than two years. Thus the cumulative gains are relatively modest. Second, for
those delaying entry into the labor force, the delay is typically longer, but the gains are realized
only in the relatively distant future. So while it may be optimal from the perspective of the period
a0 self to commit herself to a career of work, the gains from that decision (relative to the decisions
made in the absence of commitment) will be realized only after substantial work experience has
accumulated, and will thus discounted by time. The costs required in order to acquire that work
experience are, on the other hand, realized in the relatively near term, and thus discounted less
by time. As a result, from the perspective of the period a0 self, the net gains from commitment
may be relatively small even when the behavioral consequences are substantial. If, however, we
evaluate the change in utility from the perspective of the agent in her late 20s, the utility gains
from commitment can be as high as 11 percent of continuation utility.
6.2 Consequences of Time Limits
The experiment of the previous section sets an upper bound on the utility gains from com-
mitment. We know that imperfect commitment devices such as time limits and workfare can at
best deliver some fraction of these gains. Table 7 presents the results of simulation exercises when
we impose welfare eligibility time limits of varying lengths. Again we consider the behavioral and
utility consequences for individuals with di￿erent initial conditions.
[Table 7 About Here]
While each of the time limits increases the frequency of work, in doing so they almost always
reduce the lifetime utility of individuals in the model. Regardless of the limit’s length, the predicted
increases in work and decreases in utility are most dramatic for those with little education living
in high bene￿ts states (see, e.g., cells 2 and 4). The model implies that time limits are too crude
28a commitment device. As they induce more work, time limits fail to increase expected lifetime
utility. Though, for those living in low bene￿ts states, and for those with higher levels of skills
and education, the utility losses from the actual ￿ve-year time limit are quite modest (see cells 1,
3, 5 and 7). Thus, in these lower bene￿ts states, the model suggests that if the policy goal is to
promote work while limiting the utility consequences to the welfare eligible, a ￿ve-year time limit
is a reasonable tool. In higher bene￿ts states and among those with low human capital, however,
the estimated utility consequences are relatively severe.
From the perspective of the period a0 self; the preferred length of the time limit depends
somewhat on education level and type. Among those with less education (cell 3), longer limits
induce less work but generate more utility. Among those with more education (cells 5, 7, and 8)
the longest limit is most preferred, but among the shorter limits, the shorter the better. Indeed,
among these groups, eliminating welfare is preferred to a year-long time limit; and in particular,
cell 5 and 7 groups may strictly prefer the elimination of the welfare system.
6.3 Consequences of Workfare
Table 8 presents the results of a parallel analysis with workfare policies. In these experiments,
two dimensions of the policy are varied: (1) the degree to which workfare contributes to human
capital, and (2) the extent to which workfare compensates for lost home production.
[Table 8 About Here]
Policy version 1 assumes that workfare is merely \make work" { participation in the program
adds nothing to human capital. In this version of the policy, home production is compensated by
50% while on workfare through, for example, a child care subsidy. (With each policy the stigma
of welfare participation is assumed to apply.) Policy version 2 assumes workfare approximates
market work { participation in workfare contributes to work experience just as labor market work
would.51 Again home production is compensated by 50%. Last, policy version 3 replicates the
human capital structure of policy version 2, but increases home production compensation to 75%.
For the ￿rst version of the workfare policy, in which the work requirement adds nothing to
human capital while reducing home production by half, the model predicts substantial increases
in market work. Among those with less schooling, the increases in time spent in the labor market
are somewhat larger for those in low bene￿t states (see, cells 1 and 3). Among those with more
schooling, the opposite holds: make-work policies lead to the largest increases in market work for
those living in higher bene￿t states (see cells 6 and 8). Regardless of education or welfare bene￿ts
51The decay of human capital still occurs when an individual leaves market work for workfare.
29level, however, this ￿rst workfare policy reduces expected lifetime utility, though for those with
greater human capital living in low bene￿ts states, the declines are quite modest.
The predicted e￿ects of workfare can be qualitatively di￿erent, however, when the work required
adds to human capital (policy versions 2 and 3). When workfare provides the opportunity to
accumulate human capital, there are two countervailing e￿ects on decision making. On one hand,
the access to human capital at a guaranteed \wage" makes welfare a relatively attractive choice. On
the other hand, the accumulation of human capital while receiving welfare will make a transition
into market work more appealing. The simulations indicate that the dominating e￿ect vary with
the initial conditions of the agents. Relative to the \make-work" policy, the second version of the
policy leads to greater increases in market work among welfare-eligibles with relatively low human
capital in high bene￿t states (cells 2, 4 and 6). For those with higher human capital, and/or living
in low bene￿ts states (cells 1, 3, 5, 7 and 8) are the employment gains smaller with this second
policy.
When home production is compensated by half (policy version 2), the utility e￿ects of the
policy experiment are somewhat mixed. Among those with more human capital living in low
bene￿ts states, the commitment e￿ect of the policy combined with the ability to accumulate human
capital while on welfare leads to modest increases in expected lifetime utility. But those with
relatively low human capital living in high welfare bene￿t states (cells 2, 4 and 6), lifetime expected
utility declines, though the declines are quite modest. When home production is compensated by
75% (policy version 3), the model predicts, more uniformly, lifetime utility gains. These gains
are arguably modest, but mostly derive from increases in employment of a size comparable to
those derived from make-work workfare. Thus, these simulations indicate that sizeable increases
in employment among the welfare eligible can be achieved at relatively low utility cost (or indeed
with utility gains) from workfare that both generates marketable human capital and substantially
compensates for lost home production.52
7 Conclusions
Estimates of the structural parameters of a dynamic model of labor supply indicate that the
work-welfare-home decisions of never-married women with children re￿ect time-inconsistent prefer-
ences. For this group, we estimate a present-bias factor (￿) less than unity; and we reject a model
of standard discounting at standard levels of con￿dence.
Simulations of the estimated model indicate that, for this group of largely low-income, single
52The gains would be more subtantial if, as is plausible, the policy also reduced the stigma of welfare participation.
30women with children, the behavioral consequences of an inability to commit to future decisions
may be substantial but, by one measure, the utility consequences of the self-control problem are
modest. The model suggests that the ability to commit to future decisions would often lead to
considerably more work and less welfare participation. However, for those with low levels of human
capital, and living in high welfare bene￿ts states, procrastination leads to costly delays in welfare
takeup. For this group, commitment ability leads to slightly more, not less, welfare participation.
Moreover, among those entering the labor force earlier, this entry involves costs in terms of welfare
bene￿ts and home production forgone; and the bene￿ts in terms of higher wages are accrued only
in the relatively distant future. As a result, the discounted lifetime utility gains from commitment
may be small even when the behavioral consequences are large.
Further simulations of the model indicate that behavioral and utility consequences of welfare
reform policies that serve as imperfect commitment devices vary according to both the character-
istics of the intended targets and the design of the policy. We ￿nd that time limits are too crude
to enhance expected utility. While limits serve to substantially increase employment, they do so
at a sometimes substantial utility cost for the welfare-eligible. For those living in low bene￿ts
states, and for those with higher levels of skills and education, however, the utility losses from a
￿ve-year time limit are quite modest. The estimated model indicates that workfare policies also
better serve those with more education living in states with lower welfare bene￿ts. However, when
workfare leads to the accumulation of valuable human capital, and includes compensation for lost
home production through, for example, child care subsidies, the estimated model suggests that
most potential recipients will increase both their employment and their lifetime utility.
We interpret these results as quali￿ed support for the extension of standard models of dynamic
labor supply to allow for time-inconsistency. Our analysis focuses on a special group (never-married
women with children) whose preferences may not be typical of the general population, though may
be quite representative for the potential welfare population. With respect to this group, however,
our analysis indicates that allowing for time-inconsistency may be both feasible and fruitful, adding
to our understanding of the potential consequences of policy. We also view our ￿ndings as a caution
against simple arguments for accounting for the role of psychological biases in public policy. As our
simulations indicate, even when individuals display substantial present-bias in preferences, simple
policies that resemble commitment devices may not function e￿ectively as such.
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35Welfare Work Home Total
Age Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number
16 31.9 15 0.0 0 68.1 32 100.0 47
17 38.2 34 0.0 0 61.8 55 100.0 89
18 38.5 60 1.9 3 59.6 93 100.0 156
19 46.6 109 8.6 20 44.9 105 100.0 234
20 50.2 143 11.9 34 37.9 108 100.0 285
21 50.5 165 14.1 46 35.5 116 100.0 327
22 53.7 188 16.9 59 29.4 103 100.0 350
23 51.2 191 20.6 77 28.2 105 100.0 373
24 48.5 182 25.6 96 25.9 97 100.0 375
25 47.3 187 27.1 107 25.6 101 100.0 395
26 48.6 196 30.5 123 20.8 84 100.0 403
27 44.3 167 32.1 121 23.6 89 100.0 377
28 45.1 142 33.0 104 21.9 69 100.0 315
29 42.8 109 37.7 96 19.6 50 100.0 255
30 47.9 91 35.3 67 16.8 32 100.0 190
31 43.1 62 39.6 57 17.4 25 100.0 144
32 35.6 32 42.2 38 22.2 20 100.0 90
Total 47.1 2073 23.8 1048 29.1 1284 100.0 4405
Table 1: Choice Distribution, Ages 16-32, NLSY Sample of Never-married Women with at Least
One Child, 1979-1991.
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Table 2: Year-to-Year Choice Transition Matrix, NLSY Sample of Never-married Women with at







Parameters Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Preference Parameters
Discount Factors ￿ 1 n.a. 0.33802 0.06943 0.355 0.0983
￿ 0.41488 0.07693 0.87507 0.01603 0.868 0.02471
Net Stigma ￿(1) 7537.04 774.81 8126.19 834.011 8277.46 950.77
(by type) ￿(2) 10100.9 1064.83 10242.01 955.878 10350.20 1185.27
￿(3) 13333.2 1640.18 12697.25 1426.40 12533.69 1685.92
Home Production e
(1)
0 2684.97 427.85 2209.48 405.26 2224.98 456.85
(by type) e
(2)
0 3324.79 516.96 3502.66 509.07 3492.15 617.64
e
(3)
0 1729.53 1418.21 2126.86 879.54 2182.17 1227.66
e1 84.83 441.45 124.92 48.95 121.58 130.57
e2 -36.21 105.61 -603.29 215.67 -608.39 560.31
￿(1) 2484.69 494.09 4565.06 399.07 4588.88 756.19
￿(2) 4432.11 573.40 6547.94 503.62 6557.07 933.40
￿(3) 9858.23 1290.18 12149.5 869.089 12054.63 1670.74
Wage and Skill Parameters
Constant h
(1)
0 0.12881 0.09963 0.16329 0.0676 0.1672 0.1362
(by type) h
(2)
0 0.59176 0.10073 0.6121 0.06828 0.61628 0.13625
h
(3)
0 1.11547 0.12045 1.10907 0.08089 1.12299 0.14646
years of schooling ￿1 0.01995 0.0082 0.02153 0.00501 0.02166 0.00976
experience ￿2 0.13513 0.01056 0.12252 0.00853 0.12142 0.01203
experience2 ￿3 -0.00736 0.0009 -0.00623 0.00068 -0.00605 0.00099
1st year experience ￿4 0.09352 0.04291 0.06681 0.02949 0.06742 0.04535
experience decay ￿5 -0.22702 0.03601 -0.23105 0.03096 -0.23694 0.03731







Parameters Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Continuation Value Function at Age 35
num. of children !1 794.52 743350.2 2618.55 3511.39 2496.75 197163.19
num. of children2 !2 -8938.74 82101.40 -8918.7 5258.05 -8638.95 27929.24
experience !3 62.74 20429.20 235.24 268.94 231.11 4500.37
experience2 !4 -54.47 516.04 378.36 115.00 374.21 185.64
welfare lag !5 2617.59 7515.73 8707.61 6322.23 8725.00 10638.20
work lag !6 1544.06 13820.09 6151.05 4142.20 6260.41 14140.67
Log Odds as Function of Initial Conditions for Types 2 and 3
Type 2: constant ￿
(2)
0 -1.842 1.544 -1.070 1.550 -1.179 1.593
age ￿
(2)
1 0.0067 0.087 -0.0406 0.086 -0.0385 0.0867
yrs. of schooling ￿
(2)
2 0.129 0.124 0.133 0.122 0.139 0.127
experience ￿
(2)
3 0.217 0.194 0.227 0.190 0.221 0.187
welfare lag ￿
(2)
4 0.0865 0.662 0.398 0.618 0.406 0.633
work lag ￿
(2)
5 0.0131 0.578 0.062 0.587 0.0576 0.578
Type 3: constant ￿
(3)
0 -3.948 2.423 -5.627 2.328 -5.562 2.273
age ￿
(3)
1 -0.687 0.126 -0.360 0.168 -0.356 0.167
yrs. of schooling ￿
(3)
2 1.303 0.156 0.9322 0.268 0.918 0.263
experience ￿
(3)
3 0.1055 0.2811 0.314 0.278 0.318 0.277
welfare lag ￿
(3)
4 -0.526 1.252 -0.640 1.508 -0.463 1.305
work lag ￿
(3)
5 0.575 0.881 -0.13387 0.874 -0.144 0.846
Variance and Covariance of Shocks
std. dev. of ￿0 ￿￿0 5262.40 548.55 5656.61 446.56 5708.50 579.19
std. dev. of ￿1 ￿￿1 0.3751 0.0122 0.3726 0.0071 0.3707 0.0076
std. dev. of ￿2 ￿￿2 4168.06 334.76 4116.96 331.49 4074.99 459.82
cov (￿0;￿2) ￿2
￿0￿2 -3046.77 168.32 -2849.19 202.06 -2861.02 247.60
Log-likelihood -3505.96 -3489.80 -3486.44
￿2-Statistics 32.32 n.a. 6.72
Table 4: Parameter Estimates for Time Consistent, Sophisticated and Naive Present Agents (con-
tinued from Table 3).
Note: ￿
2 statistics are calculated under the null hypothesis of the present-biased sophisticated model.
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Table 5: Simulated Year-toYear Transition Probability Matrix for Sohpisticated Present-Biased
Agents.
Initial Conditions Cell
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Panel 1: Simulated Effects
change in % working 14.07 -2.74 23.32 -3.38 24.44 -1.71 24.69 13.07
change in lifetime utility $1,908 $1,632 $2,756 $1,660 $3,318 $1,713 $3,702 $2,508
% change in lifetime utility 3.41 2.42 4.78 2.37 5.33 2.47 5.03 3.26
Panel 2: Initial Conditions For Different Cells
wel. bene￿ts (1 child) 4126.53 7103.51 4103.53 7278.74 4073.25 7116.39 4278.39 7023.98
wel. bene￿ts (2 children) 5383.13 8781.58 5340.66 8969.49 5315.70 8809.24 5529.23 8746.56
age at ￿rst birth 17 18 19 19 21 20 22 22
years of schooling 9 9 11 11 12 12 14 14
work yr. before ￿rst birth No No No No Yes No No Yes
yrs of work exper. at ￿rst birth 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Prob (type = 1) 0.622 0.636 0.556 0.556 0.469 0.513 0.335 0.339
prob (type = 2) 0.356 0.349 0.383 0.383 0.454 0.387 0.383 0.412
Table 6: Simulated E￿ects of the Ability to Commit for Sophisticated Present-Biased Agents, by
Initial Conditions.
Note: Panel 1 presents the simulated e￿ects, in terms of behavior (% of time working) and discounted utility (in
1984 dollars), of providing sophisticated agents with perfect commitment ability. These simulations are provided for
8 representative cells of initial conditions. The relevant characteristics of those cells are provided in Panel 2, along























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: The Log-Likelihood Slices as a Function of ￿; for ￿ = 1 (dashed curve, left scale) and
￿ = ^ ￿ = 0:33802 (solid curve, right scale).
note: We used cubic splines in constructing the log-likelihood slices. Cubic spline smoothing may cause


























data model (sophisticated) myopic
Figure 2: Age-Welfare Participation Pro￿les: Data vs. Model Simulation for Sophisticated and
Myopic Agents.
note: The simulation of myopic agents simply sets ￿ and ￿ to zero. For that simulation, all other parameters




















data model (sophisticated) myopic
Figure 3: Age-Work Pro￿les: Data vs. Model Simulation for Sophisticated and Myopic Agents.
note: The simulation of myopic agents simply sets ￿ and ￿ to zero. For that simulation, all other parameters




















data model (sophisticated) myopic
Figure 4: Age-Home Pro￿les: Data vs. Model Simulation for Sophisticated and Myopic Agents.
note: The simulation of myopic agents simply sets ￿ and ￿ to zero. For that simulation, all other parameters













































Figure 5: Mean Accepted Wages for Workers by Age: Data vs. Model Simulation for Sophisticated
Agents.




































































































Figure 7: Age-Decision Pro￿le: Comparison of Out-of-Sample Data and Simulation with Estimated
Parameters (Sophisticated Agents).
4748A Appendix: Additional Tables and Estimates
Descriptive Statistics of the Selected Women and All Women Table A1 compares the
statistics of our selected subsample (never married women with at least one child) with those of the
entire sample of women in the NLSY. It shows that the subsample has on average more children at
every age. By age 32, the gap is relatively small with the subsample having on average 2.1 children,
and the entire sample 1.6. At every age the subsample has an average of 1.25 fewer years of work
experience, and 2.01 more years of AFDC receipt; and at every age older than 19, full-time workers
in the subsample earn on average $1,456 less than their counterparts in the entire sample. On
average, the subsample has also completed fewer years of schooling (10.9) than the entire sample
(12.6).
Estimates of Welfare Bene￿t Function Gj Table A2 presents the estimates of welfare bene￿t
functions for the twenty U.S. states used in our estimation.
Fertility Function ￿ Table A3 presents the estimates of the fertility function ￿:
Within-Sample Goodness of Fit Test Table A4 presents the ￿2 goodness-of-￿t test of the
within-sample choice distributions by age. The column labelled by \Row" is the ￿2 statistic for

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 2380.45 1238.01 3618.46 4856.48 39.6
2 2467.68 1301.31 3768.99 5070.30 50.0
3 2962.66 1203.84 4166.50 5370.34 32.9
4 2979.62 1280.44 4260.06 5540.50 22.5
5 3128.33 1340.02 4468.35 5808.38 39.2
6 3493.63 1186.81 4680.45 5867.26 29.6
7 3541.08 1251.03 4792.11 6043.13 50.3
8 3985.20 1212.98 5198.18 6411.15 46.6
9 4348.62 1098.98 5447.60 6546.58 28.2
10 4358.47 1318.76 5677.23 6995.99 71.0
11 4279.58 1419.96 5699.54 7119.50 51.2
12 4509.59 1368.62 5878.21 7246.83 29.4
13 4183.05 1539.27 5722.32 7261.59 13.6
14 4592.94 1343.95 5936.89 7280.83 20.2
15 4511.30 1411.63 5922.93 7334.57 66.8
16 5005.98 1480.68 6486.65 7967.33 52.5
17 4988.00 1577.07 6565.07 8142.15 27.0
18 5634.63 1661.86 7296.49 8958.35 61.7
19 5317.42 1851.81 7169.23 9021.04 69.7
20 6264.03 1613.01 7877.04 9490.05 68.5
Mean 4146.61 1385.00 5531.62 6916.62 43.5
Std. Dev. 1042.30 187.46 1182.51 1334.38 17.9
*: To preserve the anonyminity of respondents, we were not provided with state names.
**: Percent of Sample living in the corresponding State that choose welfare
Table A2: Estimated Annual Welfare Bene￿ts Function, Summary Statistics (1987 dollars)
51Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Constant ￿0 -0.811 0.323
Age ￿1 -0.044 0.015
Number of Existing Children ￿2 -0.077 0.059
Is She on Welfare? ￿3 0.094 0.115





Table A3: Logit Estimates of the Fertility Function.
52Choice
Age Welfare Work Home Row
18 6.09￿ y 0.19 6.28￿
19 4.56￿ 0.79 2.05 7.40￿
20 7.82￿ 3.76 2.18 13.76￿
21 2.63 3.78 0.16 6.56￿
22 3.98￿ 4.19￿ 0.50 8.68￿
23 1.28 1.94 0.03 3.25
24 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.32
25 0.61 0.00 1.32 1.93
26 0.23 1.46 0.38 2.07
27 1.39 1.38 0.17 2.93
28 0.25 0.00 0.72 0.97
29 0.64 1.06 0.02 1.72
30 0.32 0.36 0.00 0.68
31 0.19 0.00 0.66 0.85
32 0.77 0.12 4.63￿ 5.52￿
￿ : Signi￿cant at the 5% level.
y : Fewer than 5 obervations.
Table A4: ￿2 Goodness-of-Fit Tests of the Within-Sample Choice Distribution By Age, Model with
Sophisticated Agents.
53B Appendix: Simulation Results for Completely Naive Present-
Biased Agents
We present the simulation results for naive present-biased agents in this appendix.
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Table B5: Simulated Year-toYear Transition Probability Matrix for Naive Present-Biased Agents.
Initial Conditions Cell
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
changes in % working 9.41 -2.79 17.95 -3.07 22.58 -2.16 23.80 11.30
% change in lifetime utility 2.82 2.39 4.23 2.43 4.95 2.47 5.00 3.17
Table B6: Simulated E￿ects of the Ability to Commit for Naive Present-Biased Agents, by Initial
Conditions.
Note: This table presents the simulated e￿ects, in terms of behavior (% of time working) and discounted utility
(in 1984 dollars), of providing naive agents with perfect commitment ability. These simulations are provided for 8
representative cells of initial conditions. See Panel 2 of Table 6 for initial conditions for the di￿erent cells.
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c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
u
t
i
l
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
%
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
0
:
7
6
2
0
:
6
1
￿
3
:
5
0
1
9
:
7
8
1
:
9
6
1
7
:
7
8
￿
2
:
6
9
2
3
:
9
3
2
:
4
0
7
:
7
9
￿
1
:
7
3
2
5
:
6
3
1
:
8
5
7
:
2
9
2
:
0
2
1
8
:
2
7
W
o
r
k
f
a
r
e
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
3
%
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
u
t
i
l
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
%
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
5
:
4
9
1
3
:
0
2
4
:
7
7
1
2
:
9
8
5
:
5
7
1
2
:
0
6
4
:
9
1
1
6
:
3
0
4
:
5
9
2
:
2
1
5
:
2
9
1
8
:
5
2
3
:
3
2
2
:
5
6
5
:
7
4
9
:
2
1
T
a
b
l
e
B
8
:
S
i
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
E
￿
e
c
t
s
o
f
W
o
r
k
f
a
r
e
P
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
f
o
r
N
a
i
v
e
P
r
e
s
e
n
t
-
B
i
a
s
e
d
a
g
e
n
t
s
,
b
y
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
N
o
t
e
:
E
a
c
h
r
o
w
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
t
h
e
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
,
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
(
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
%
o
f
t
i
m
e
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
)
a
n
d
d
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
u
t
i
l
i
t
y
(
i
n
1
9
8
4
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
)
,
o
f
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
i
n
g
t
h
e
w
o
r
k
f
a
r
e
p
o
l
i
c
y
g
i
v
e
n
i
n
t
h
e
￿
r
s
t
c
e
l
l
o
f
t
h
e
r
o
w
.
I
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
1
,
t
h
e
p
o
l
i
c
y
i
s
m
a
k
e
-
w
o
r
k
:
w
e
l
f
a
r
e
e
l
i
g
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
s
f
u
l
l
-
t
i
m
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
t
h
i
s
w
o
r
k
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
t
o
h
u
m
a
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
.
H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
5
0
%
o
f
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
h
o
m
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
l
o
s
t
f
r
o
m
w
o
r
k
f
a
r
e
i
s
p
a
i
d
f
o
r
b
y
,
f
o
r
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
,
a
c
h
i
l
d
-
c
a
r
e
s
u
b
s
i
d
y
.
I
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
2
,
t
h
e
p
o
l
i
c
y
i
s
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
t
h
a
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
s
t
o
h
u
m
a
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
j
u
s
t
l
i
k
e
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
I
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
3
,
t
h
e
p
o
l
i
c
y
i
s
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
a
s
t
h
a
t
i
n
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
2
e
x
c
e
p
t
t
h
a
t
7
5
%
o
f
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
h
o
m
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
l
o
s
t
f
r
o
m
w
o
r
k
f
a
r
e
i
s
p
a
i
d
f
o
r
b
y
c
h
i
l
d
-
c
a
r
e
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
e
s
.
T
h
e
s
e
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
f
o
r
8
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
c
e
l
l
s
o
f
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
(
t
h
e
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
)
.
S
e
e
P
a
n
e
l
2
o
f
T
a
b
l
e
6
f
o
r
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
d
i
￿
e
r
e
n
t
c
e
l
l
s
.
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